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NEGOTIATING ISLAM IN EMERGING PUBLIC 
SPHERES IN CONTEMPORARY TAJIKISTAN
Shahnoza Nozimova, George Mason University 
Tim Epkenhans, Freiburg University 
Abstract 1
Over the past decade, the Internet has emerged as a new public sphere in the Central Asian 
republic of Tajikistan in particular for negotiating ‘Islam’ – religious belief, practice and morality. 
Whilst the authoritarian regime severely restricts the ‘traditional’ public spheres, the Internet has 
proven to be more resilient and elusive to government control. Blocked web pages move to other 
domains, and, in particular, labour migration has ‘denationalized’ public spheres. Additionally, the 
Internet has altered the form and content of how Islam is communicated due to the anonymity of 
the internet and its less formal customs of communication. After discussing some general theore-
tical and methodological implications, we chart how one of Tajikistan’s most prominent families 
within the religious elite – the three Turaǧon-brothers – negotiates landscapes of Islamic belief and 
practice within the context of the country’s political economy. Particularly, we present how the 
Turaǧon-brothers deal with religious, moral, and ethical queries addressed to them by Muslim 
women, and how they formulate alternative discourses about the role of women in society and 
religion contradicting the government’s conceptions. 
1. Negotiating Islam in post-Civil War Tajikistan:
authenticity, morality and social order
Post-independence and post-Civil War (1992–1997) Tajikistan has witnessed a 
number of contradictory narratives with regard to the role and importance of 
Islam in the society. For a decade after the general peace accord of 1997, Islam 
was largely excluded from the nation building project of the authoritarian 
government of Emomalī Rahmon. The government and parts of the urban civil 
society considered public observance of Islamic religious practice (prayer, 
mosque attendance, Islamic rites de passage and so forth) and the articulation of 
Islamic concepts of a social and political order as diametrically opposed to the 
1 Corresponding author: tim.epkenhans@orient.uni-freiburg.de. 
966 SHAHNOZA NOZIMOVA AND TIM EPKENHANS 
AS/EA LXVII•3•2013, S. 965–990 
post-conflict political economy and ‘peace’ in Tajikistan.2 In particular, in the 
light of the global war on terror the Tajik government is instantly classifying po-
litical and social opposition as manifestations of ‘Islamic radicalism’, regardless 
of the particular context of conflict and grievance in the Tajik society.3 
Discursively, the government refers to race (nažod), language, and a care-
fully filtered historical legacy as the core identity markers for Tajiks.4 However, 
government symbolic projections of a glorious past, present and future bear little 
to no tangible repercussions for large parts of the population – except for an 
architectural remake of Dushanbe reflecting an imagination of an alleged histo-
rically authentic Tajik panache. Instead, the population is exposed to economic 
and social exclusion, corruption and nepotism among the dominating elite, the 
complete absence of the rule of law and continuous centre-periphery tensions, 
which have turned sporadically violent.  
Despite hostile religious policies, public observation of Islamic religious 
practices as well as an Islamic habitus has significantly increased among parts of 
the population over the past decade. Although surveys in Tajikistan often suffer 
from methodological inconsistencies, the available data and research supports 
this impression. For an increasing percentage of Tajikistan’s population – in 
particular, its younger generation – Islam signifies an important element of an 
‘authentic’ Tajik identity and a moral as well as spiritual guidance in the 
complex post-Soviet and post-conflict transformation.5 Additionally, the younger 
generation of Tajiks considers the Civil War as distant history and does not 
necessarily follow government interpretations of the origins of the Civil War.6 
The widening gap between official representations and the actual cleavages and 
grievances within the society might have contributed to a cynical renunciation of 
the official orchestration of “virtual politics”7 by the Tajik government. 
2  HEATHERSHAW , 2009; EPKENHANS,  2011. 
3  Cf. HEATHERSHAW / MEGORAN, 2011. 
4  For instance, in 2006 the government celebrated the year of Aryan civilization. Cf. BLAK-
KISRUD / NOZIMOVA, 2010; EPKENHANS, 2012; LARUELLE, 2007. 
5  IFES, 2010. Cf. also: EPKENHANS, 2011; STEPHAN, 2010. For similar developments in 
Central Asia/Uzbekistan: LOUW, 2007 and RASANAYAGAM, 2010. As Adeeb Khalid points 
out, ethnicity, the idea of tradition, and religion increasingly became intertwined already in 
the late Soviet Union, KHALID, 2007: 84–115. 
6  This observation is based on a review of Tajikistan’s press and conversations with Tajik 
students in the past years. 
7  Cf. WILSON, 2005. 
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Yet, the post-Soviet renaissance of Islam is not the only noticeable social 
process happening in Tajik society. Arguably, the most important one is that in-
creasing numbers of Tajik citizens are leaving the country (seasonally and long-
term) mainly for Russia and Kazakhstan in search of employment. The most 
recent data from the Migration and Remittances Unit of the World Bank sug-
gests that about 800,000 (11.2% of the total population, predominately younger 
men) have emigrated from Tajikistan and their remittances generate approx. 
47% of the country’s GDP (the highest share worldwide).8 Considering these 
significant numbers, it is reasonable to assume that labour migration has remark-
able implications for the overall society in Tajikistan, including its diverse and 
contested religious field.9
The increasing public observation of Islamic practices is also related to the 
politics of Tajikistan’s religious specialists, the ulamo, who address immediate 
grievances and social issues in the Tajik society in their sermons and in their 
religious advice (pand or nasihat). Usually, the religious advice is considered 
part of the larger idea of ‘Commanding Right’ (Tajik: amr ba maʿruf or amri 
maʿruf) and the struggle for general public welfare (maslahat) in a Muslim 
society.10 In recent years, in the Tajik social context the term has become a 
synonym for advice given by religious specialists. Most of the advice is related 
to questions about religious practice, for instance the ritual prayer (namoz), the 
ablution (ġosl, vuzuʿ, tayammom), the fasting (ruza) during Ramadan, and so 
forth. However, a significant part of the advice, as we show in this paper, is 
related to more general social or personal affairs reflecting the changing social 
landscapes of post-Civil War Tajikistan.11 Whilst religious advice was usually 
given either before or after the Friday prayer personally by an imom-xatib (or 
sar-xatib, the leader of the Friday prayer), the internet has changed the patterns 
of giving advice radically. 
This paper to some extent explores uncharted waters by providing insights 
into new forms of negotiating Islam in Tajikistan, namely the popular ‘Islamic’ 
websites of the Turaǧon-family. We are aware that we are only discussing a very 
limited section and moment of the complex religious life-worlds in contem-
porary Tajikistan and that the ‘Islamic’ internet is changing and transforming 
rapidly. 
8 WORLD BANK, 2013.
9 Cf. BENNETT / CLIFFORD / FALKINGHAM, 2013; HEGLAND, 2010.
10 COOK, 2000.
11 Cf. HALLAQ, 2011: 144.
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2. Theoretical and methodological considerations
Since the late 1990s, scholars have been exploring the intriguing intersection of 
Islam and the new forms of media and communication. In conceptual terms, 
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of public sphere and Benedict Anderson’s “imagined 
communities” have been identified as central methodological frames in the 
analysis of the producers and consumers of the Islamic normativity.12 Notably, 
the related negotiations are increasingly taking place in a transnational environ-
ment enabled by recent technological advances.13 Commenting on the recent 
developments in Muslim societies, Eickelman and Anderson note that a “new 
sense of public is emerging throughout Muslim-majority states and Muslim 
communities elsewhere”. The distinctive aspect of this new “Muslim public 
sphere” is in the fact that it is “[s]ituated outside formal state control” and that it
“exists at the intersections of religious, political, and social life”. The Muslim 
public sphere, as the authors propose, has the potential of challenging and limit-
ing the traditional forms of authority – in the state, as well as, in the domain of 
religion. The new forms of media and communication play a central role in the 
Muslim public sphere: 
[T]his combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates 
fosters an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic 
values can be created and feeds into new senses of a public space that is discursive, per-
formative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state 
authorities.14
This emphasis on the new, technologically advanced media and communication 
deserves further elaboration. Building on Benedict Anderson’s conception of 
speech communities, scholars have suggested that the new acts and techno-
logical experiences enabled by the new forms of communication (e.g. “down-
loading together” as similar to “reading together”) foster a sense of community 
and shared consciousness.15 This phenomenon is most vividly observed when 
analysing the notable level of mobilization among the followers of the Turaǧon-
brothers in Russia.  
12 ANDERSON, 2003: 892–893; HABERMAS, 1981. In the context of this paper, normativity is 
understood as a discursively constructed concept.
13 SISLER, 2009: 52; MANDAVILLE, 2001: 166.
14 EICKELMAN / ANDERSON, 2003: 1–2.
15 MANDAVILLE, 2011: 15.
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Asef Bayat calls this phenomenon “imagined solidarity” – “which is forged 
spontaneously among different actors who come to a consensus by imagining, 
subjectively constructing, common interests and shared values between them-
selves”. For Bayat imagined solidarity is a product of authoritarian societies 
“where the effective exchange of ideas and communicative action in the public 
sphere are lacking”.16 And although Bayat does not specifically point out to the 
role of the new media and communication technologies, one could argue that 
these mediums are the most important channels in facilitating the process of 
such “imagining” as these technologies are notorious for being less susceptible 
to government regulation and control. The ubiquitous usage of mirror/proxy 
services to bypass state censorship and gain access to restricted Internet content 
in most authoritarian polities, including Tajikistan, is just one example of the 
affordability that the new technology provide in the process of fostering a new 
public sphere with a distinct sense of consciousness/solidarity.17 
In the context of the present case study these conceptual frames have clear 
implications. The repetitive blocking of access to the Turaǧon website in Tajiki-
stan with directives coming from the state communications agency indicates that 
it is part of the greater attempt by the Tajik regime to encroach upon not only the 
more “traditional” public sphere but also the newly burgeoning one.18 Some state 
officials naively believe that by censoring the national Internet providers they 
can confine the new public sphere that is emerging in the digitally facilitated 
frontiers. The government’s efforts seem especially desperate when labour 
migration is taken into account. Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend how state 
officials plan to restrict development of this new public sphere in the context of 
transnational labour movement. Whilst the Tajik government’s censorship 
capacity is limited to its borders (at best), close to a million Tajik labourers 
enjoy greater freedoms (if not in civic then, certainly, in religious terms) as a 
consequence of their living and working in Russia.19 The presentation of the 
emerging public sphere and the process of imagining new solidarities in the 
16  BAYAT, 2005: 904. 
17  Cf. in general to BRADBURY, 2011; for Iran: GOLKAR, 2011; SHIRAZI, 2012; for Tunisia: 
WAGNER, 2012. 
18  DAVLAT, 2011. The Turaǧon website is not the only website that is, rather regularly, sub-
jected to blockage under the pretenses of ‘technical / prophylactic’ works. Social media out-
lets like Facebook and Odnoklassniki, as well as news media sites or the homepage of the 
Islamic Revival Party (<www.nahzat.org>) on more than one occasion have been blocked as 
a result of such ‘technical / prophylactic’ works. 
19  Cf. HEATHERSHAW, 2011; STAROSTIN, 2012. 
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context of Tajikistan and Tajik labour migrants should include an important 
caveat that these are, certainly, projects in the making. 
Similarly, landscapes of ‘female Islam’ should be understood in this con-
text: Public religious life-worlds manifest a strong gender separation and there is 
in our observation no interaction between female religious specialists (usually 
called bibī-xalifa, bibī-otun, bibī-mullo) and their male colleagues. 20 Since 
women are banned from regular mosque services since 2004, they could not 
address religious issues in public. However, the transformation of public spheres 
due to the increasing online presence by (male) religious authorities in Tajikistan 
has changed these paradigms, and since a few years women can address in a 
public but anonymous forum religious issues to male religious authorities.21 As 
we show in this paper, male religious specialists approach gender issues and the 
particular situation of women in contemporary Tajik society as part of the larger 
social and political contexts of labour migration and the increasing deterioration 
of traditional family structures. 
The presentation of amri maʿruf and religious advice or (as the Turaǧon-
brothers themselves call them) fatvo (plural: fatovo) on a webpage has further 
methodological implications that we need to address briefly. First, websites, 
blogs, and other online platforms in Tajikistan have changed frequently in recent 
years – this is also the case with the Turaǧon website we are discussing in this 
paper. Since 2009, we have collected around 1,200 fatovo from the suolu ǧavob 
(question and answer section) from their webpage. However, in September 2012, 
the design of the website (see below) changed and some fatovo were deleted, as 
the setup of the fatovo was restructured and professionalized. Second, the online 
communication is less formal than is usually observed between religious autho-
rities and their followers. The language is often colloquial with little attention to 
correct orthography (partly even written in Latin and not in the modified Cyrillic 
Tajik). The answers by the three brothers are likewise less formal and different 
from their print publications regarding the use of religious sources.22 Perhaps, 
20 Research on ‘female Islam’ in Tajikistan is more fragmentary than consistent, cf. for in-
stance STEPHAN, 2010. For Uzbekistan cf. FATHI, 1997; KLEINMICHEL, 2002; KRÄMER, 2002.
21 For the Turaǧon brothers <http://turajon.org/faq/cat.php?cat_id=7>; the IRPT offers a simi-
lar service <http://www.nahzat.org/nahzat/suol>; cf. also <http://wasatiyat.tj/> and the Ira-
nian site <http://www.taqrib.info/tajik/>.
22 For instance, the publications of Hoǧī Akbar Turaǧonzoda are based on a wide range of 
religious texts which he meticulously quotes including bibliographical references, cf. TURA-
ǦONZODA, 2006/2007/2011. In the online fatovo, there are a few references to the Koran but 
not to any other sources (such as hadith).
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the less formal setting attracts a younger generation of Tajik Muslims who are 
experienced users of social media outlets but would hesitate to address a reli-
gious specialist personally. 23  However, there is insufficient data on the lay 
Muslim who submit their questions to the Turaǧon-brothers to support this 
hypothesis, and we are keenly aware of this deficit in our research. 
3. The Turaǧon-brothers and their religious enterprise 
The website <www.turajon.org> is operated by ešoni Nuriddinǧon Qahorov/ 
Turaǧon24, Hoǧī Akbar Turaǧonzoda and ešoni Mahmudǧon Qahorov/Turaǧon, 
three sons of the late ešoni Muhammadrafiʿ, better known as ešoni Turaǧon 
(1934–2005), a highly venerated Qaderiyya sheikh in the Qarotegin and Hisor 
Valleys of central Tajikistan. The three brothers follow a division of labour 
covering various aspects of Islamic practice and teaching in contemporary Taji-
kistan: As the oldest brother, ešoni Nuriddinǧon (b. 1953) is the spiritual heir to 
the sanctity (karomat) of his father in the local genealogy of the Qaderiyya, 
Nuriddinǧon studied in informal religious circles (huǧra) with non-registered 
religious specialists, in particular domullo Muhammadǧon Hindustānī, one of the 
central figures of Islamic revival in post-Stalinist Central Asia.25 As the former 
imom-xatib of the Xalifa Abdulkarim Friday mosque in Vahdat (until 2003 
Kofarnihon, 25 km east of Dushanbe) he organized the weekly Friday prayer 
(xutba) and performs religious ceremonies for his followers. During religious 
ceremonies at the Xalifa Abdulkarim mosque (with an attendance of perhaps 
10.000 people), students or followers (murids) of Nuriddinǧon record the events 
on audio and video tapes which are distributed throughout Tajikistan and usually 
sold reasonably priced in local bazars or in front of mosques. The same record-
ings can be found as downloadable files on the web platform. Ešoni Nuriddinǧon 
is the central religious authority in the family and avoids political statements. 
23  In general, public interaction in the Tajik society is relatively strictly formalized in genera-
tional and gender hierarchies.  
24  Qah[h]orov was the family name of the Turaǧon (also: Tūraǧon) family during Soviet times. 
Literature from the 1990s sometimes refers to Hoǧī Akbar Turaǧonzoda as Akbar 
Qah[h]orov. In the late 1980s, many Tajiks changed their ‘Soviet’ family names to more 
‘authentic’ ones. ešon is a honorific title (and grammatically a personal pronoun for the 
third-person plural) for important representatives of Sufism in parts of Central Asia. 
25  DUDOIGNON, 2011. 
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During the Civil War in Tajikistan, he accompanied his father to exile in 
Kazakhstan (returning in 1998). The youngest of the three brothers, ešoni 
Mahmudǧon (b. 1960), appears – compared to his two older brothers – less in 
public and has been devoted to scholarly work. Similar to his brother ešoni
Nuriddinǧon, Mahmudǧon was trained in Islamic sciences by non-registered 
religious specialists.  
Arguably, the most prominent representative of the Turaǧon family is Hoǧī 
Akbar Turaǧonzoda (b. 1954), who occupies a leading role in Tajikistan’s po-
litics since the late 1980s. As an independent, self-confident, and popular 
qozikalon26, he challenged the political nomenclature of the late Soviet Union 
and eventually supported the heterogeneous democratic and Islamist opposition 
in the tumultuous years between 1991 and 1992. During the Civil War, Hoǧī 
Akbar was appointed deputy chairman of the IRPT, but left the party after the 
general peace accord 1997 due to disagreements with the undisputed post-Civil 
War chairman of the IRPT, Abdullo Nurī. He eventually served as Vice Prime 
Minister (1999–2005) and Senator of Tajikistan’s Upper House (2005–2010).27
Hoǧī Akbar is a polarizing figure in contemporary Tajikistan: Whilst some hold 
him responsible for the outbreak of the Civil War, others consider him as a 
distinguished politician and singular religious authority. Although Hoǧī Akbar 
has not occupied any official position since 2010 and has repeatedly insinuated 
that his political ambitions are muted, he is highly visible in Tajikistan’s media 
as a popular commentator on political affairs, a potential candidate for various 
political offices or a disputatious religious specialist. Importantly, he is one of 
the few religious specialists who frequently publish on religious affairs, such as 
the role of women in a Muslim society, the challenge of radical Islamic groups 
or the social-economic dimensions of Islamic charity. 28 Furthermore, Hoǧī 
Akbar is also a businessman, owning the cotton-processing plant Paxta in Vah-
dat and agricultural areas under cotton cultivation, thus highlighting his vested 
economic interests. Perhaps due to his popularity and elusiveness, Hoǧī Akbar 
has been vilified by representatives of Tajikistan’s government and government 
loyal media since 2010. The conflict escalated in late 2011 when the chairman of 
the quasi-government High Council of ulamo of Tajikistan,29 Said Mukarram 
26 The office of the qozikalon (‘supreme judge’) was, between 1988 and 1996, the highest 
office in the quasi-state administration of Islamic affairs (qoziyot).
27 EPKENHANS, 2011: 85–86. 
28 TURAǦONZODA, 2006 / 2007 / 2011.
29 The High Council of ulamo (Šuroi olii ulamoi Toǧikiston) is since 1996 next to the Depart-
ment for Religious Affairs the central government body for administering registered Islamic 
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Abdulqodirzoda, accused ešoni Nuriddinǧon and Hoǧī Akbar of instigating reli-
gious hatred by performing the Shia ceremony of ʿašūra commemorating the 
martyrdom of al-Husayn at Kerbala 680 CE in a majority Sunni Muslim 
society.30 Eventually, the High Council of ulamo demoted the Xalifa Abdul-
karim Friday mosque to a regular five-times-prayer mosque (masǧidi panǧ 
vaqta), thus depriving ešoni Nuriddinǧon of the opportunity to conduct the im-
portant congregational Friday prayer. 
4. Virtual Islam?
The website of the Turaǧon-brothers was established in the mid-2000s under the 
domain <www.turajon.org>. The website was relatively stable until September 
2012, when the layout was substantially changed to a more professional design. 
Simultaneously, the three brothers with <www.facebook.com/turajon> and 
<http://www.youtube.com/turajoncom> opened their own pages on Facebook 
and Youtube Channel. In early March 2013, the website was offline for a few 
days sparking rumours in the Tajik media about a government crackdown or an 
attack by hackers on the website. 31 However, the rumours were not sub-
stantiated, and the website continued to operate as before. 
The current website of the Turaǧon-brothers was originally created under 
the domain name turajon with a ‘.com’ extension, and in mid-September of 
2012, a new website was launched with the same domain name but with an 
‘.org’ extension. The new website provides improved functionality and a better 
aesthetic value, however the content is rather limited in comparison to the infor-
mation that was available at the old website (some sections, such as Taʿlimi 
Islom being completely empty). Since the mid-2000s, websites by religious spe-
cialists such as the Turaǧon-brothers or Hoǧī Mirzo (another highly popular 
younger imom-xatib in Kūlob who is affiliated with ešoni Nuriddinǧon), or lay 
religious bloggers have rapidly developed and indicate an important shift to 
________________________________ 
institutions and their personnel. In recent years, the High Council, in co-ordination with the 
Department for Religious Affairs, has emerged as a more interventionist institution trying to 
establish a tighter control over the religious field in Tajikistan (EPKENHANS, 2011: 81–82). 
30 ISLAMNEWS.TJ, 2011.
31 OZODAGON, 2013.
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virtuality in the negotiation of religion in Tajikistan. As it is stated in the Tamos 
(contact) page, the goal is to connect followers of the Turaǧon brothers:  
We are very happy to successfully use modern technology and establish a bridge of commu-
nication between you and the greatest men of this nation, brave and devoted Muslims. As 
you all know, communicating with the noble men of Islam became difficult in our present 
day society, especially for the one million Muslim brothers that are abroad, working in harsh 
conditions to fulfil the needs of their families. When they encounter problems in their every-
day lives and want to find an Islamic solution from an advisor, whose faith and unwavering 
opinion they trust, but do not have access to … for that reason it is very appropriate to 
implement this initiative. Let this website be a way for you to connect with the community 
of knowledge and wisdom of our land! 
Importantly, the necessity of the Turaǧon webpage is further justified by the em-
phasised limitations of the traditional public sphere:  
Unfortunately, mass media (TV, radio and print press) have taken away [the] right [to 
communicate with religious authorities] from the Muslims of our country. Therefore, to the 
best of our capacity we have tried to create an Internet site exclusively dedicated to this 
great family, the family of Hazrati ešoni Turaǧon (rahimahullah). So that we can introduce 
you to these outstanding men, their writings and teachings. 
Additionally, one could see the website as being an initiative coming from the 
younger followers of the Turaǧon-brothers, who notice the general trend among 
the foreign religious authorities which already have an established online pre-
sence. For example, there are many websites of Iranian origin, which speci-
fically target Tajik audience.32 
The website, predominantly consists of internal links with the only external 
link being to <www.quranflash.com>. It is rather user-friendly and not over-
loaded with information or images. Interestingly, the previous webpage (pre-
2012) contained more introductory resources on Islamic belief and practice 
(including conversion) as well as links to Islamic institutions and organizations, 
whilst the suolu ǧavob section was not particularly prominently placed. The 
current website, however, is centred on this section, and there is – except for the 
Turaǧon-brothers’ own treatises – no additional material available. Additionally, 
the production of fatovo has significantly increased over the past years perhaps 
32  Cf. for an overview on the Sunni internet in Iran DUDOIGNON, 2009. 
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due to high demand by lay Muslim Tajiks.33 We assume that the website was 
tailored to the particular needs of their audience. However, the site does have 
pages dedicated to biographies of each of the brothers and their revered father. 
Also, Hoǧī Akbar Turaǧonzoda’s books in electronic format, as well as some of 
his treatise and articles and essays of Mahmudǧon are published on the website. 
The multimedia section of the website contains video recordings (embedded 
YouTube links) of the xutbas and talks delivered by Nuriddinǧon and Mah-
mudǧon. Interestingly, most of the audio and video files can be downloaded in 
compressed cell-phone readable file formats (as .mp3 format for audio and .mp4 
for video content).  
One of the features of the new website is the introduction of some degree of 
interactivity, where the visitors can ‘evaluate’ the video, audio, and textual con-
tent using thumbs up (‘Like’) and thumbs down (‘Dislike’) buttons as in other 
popular social media. The new website also tries to accommodate some of the 
contemporary ‘Web 2.0’ experience by introducing the “Inform your friends” 
option, which allows sharing of the link to the specific content (audio, video, 
text) using most prominent social media tools (not only Facebook, Google+, and 
Twitter, but also – taking into account the audience of the site – Moy Mir, 
Odnoklassniki, and VKontakte, which are very popular in a Russian speaking 
context). 
The ‘Question and Answer’ (Suolu ǧavob) section of the website we dis-
cuss in this paper is divided into nine sub-sections: aqida (belief, dogmatic 
theology), tahorat (ablution), namoz (prayer), zakot (alms), ruza (fasting during 
Ramadan), haǧ (pilgrimage), xossi zanho (special section for women), 
muomaloti molī (financial affairs), and masoili gunogun (miscellaneous). As the 
overview indicates, some 2/3 of the questions submitted deal with ritual practice 
while 1/3 are related to ethical and societal issues. 
Each of the sub-sections is then composed of a list of hyperlinked titles that 
provide a general idea about the specific fatvo (legal opinion). Clicking on the 
title makes the text of the question appear, followed by the answer and 
information on the petitioner (voluntarily provided name or alias), identifying 
which of the brothers issued the answer, the date when the question was posted, 
and also a counter of how many people viewed that particular fatvo.
33 Compared to previous years (2008–2011), the number of published fatovo has significantly 
increased since 2012. However, there is no data on the actual number of questions addressed 
to the Turaǧon family per month.
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The question petition form allows the visitor to specify which of the 
brothers they wish to address. A new addition to the petition form page was the 
recent introduction of the fatvo search tab, where an entered keyword produces a 
drop-down list of possible titles of fatovo where the entered word or phrase is 
present. The visitors are urged to use the fatovo search options before they post a 
question, since it is claimed that most of the questions are repeated. Interest-
ingly, a cell-phone number is provided as an alternative channel of commu-
nication “in case of difficulties”.
5. Female societal dimensions
in the online advice of the Turaǧon-brothers
After women were banned by the quasi-governmental High Council of Taji-
kistan’s ulamo in 2004, the Turaǧon-brothers have repeatedly and provocatively 
addressed the question of the role of women in a Muslim society and challenged 
the government’s policy. Nuriddinǧon, as the imom-xatib of the Xalifa Abdu-
karim Friday mosque, has publicly ignored the ban and admitted women to the 
prayer. Hoǧī Akbar published an extensive study on the place of women in Islam 
refuting the judgement of the High Council of Tajikistan’s ulamo.34
In their public statements the Turaǧon-brothers must perform a balancing 
act satisfying the expectations of their conservative male audience as well as 
their female followers. Importantly, this is taking place in the dramatically 
changing social contexts in which the Soviet claim of gender equality is in-
creasingly yielding to the dominance of patriarchal structures and imaginations 
of an allegedly authentic Tajik tradition of gender and generational hierarchies. 
However, labour migration has, at the same time, deeply eroded the social 
fabrics in Tajikistan’s society with women forced to act formally or informally 
as heads of households. Thus, gendered role models, concepts of male / female 
honour as well as gender and generational hierarchies are simultaneously under-
mined by the social realities.35 On the one hand, the Turaǧon-brothers must 
acknowledge that female headed households are increasingly important in the 
societal context of Tajikistan (and therefore have to address female Muslims 
directly and fulfil specific female expectations). On the other hand, they need to 
34 TURAǦONZODA, 2011.
35 Cf. FALKINGHAM / BASCHIERI, 2009; HARRIS, 2004.
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represent in the specific post-Soviet context of negotiating Islam in Central Asia 
and Tajikistan, a rather normative position which confirms the central scriptural 
concepts of Islamic gender relations. A more reformist or ‘innovative’ interpre-
tation would, in our opinion, not be understood by the majority of lay Muslims 
in this specific context. Therefore, the Turaǧon-brothers repeatedly feel obliged 
to confirm that the central Islamic sources – Koran and hadith – attribute the 
same dignity to men and women, but burden men and women with different reli-
gious obligations.36 The related discussion of male / female dignity, the hijab
issue as well as the practice of polygyny, illustrates their balancing act. For in-
stance, Nuriddinǧon responds to a question by “Kudratullo” (13 January 2013)37
whether women are less intelligent (kam aql) than men with a lengthy and well-
articulated answer. The response indicates the importance of this question for the 
Turaǧon-brothers, as evidenced by the number of times this particular question 
was raised. Nuriddinǧon clearly rejects the idea that women are intellectually 
imperfect (noqisulaqle) and explains that Islam was revealed to both sexes. And 
that men and women are equally responsible for their deeds in front of God. He 
also ascertains (based on a hadith) that men and women possess similar intelli-
gence. Additionally, he concedes that women usually show more empathy and 
sympathy (otifa) than men and provides the example of ʿĀʾiša bint Abī Bakr 
(Muḥammad’s third wife), who is considered by the Islamic tradition as a scho-
lar in her own right. Importantly, the discussion of the role of women in Islam 
(and in the larger society) is utilized by the Turaǧon-brothers – and in particular 
by Hoǧī Akbar – in their dispute with Tajikistan’s government and the quasi-
state High Council of Tajikistan’s ulamo.  
6. Polygyny and hijab
Tajikistan’s civil code explicitly stipulates a state sanctioned monogamy, which 
means that only marriages registered with the ZAGS registry office (Otdel 
zapisey aktov grazhdanskogo sostoyaniya) can have legal consequences; the 
religious nikoh is viewed as only a ceremonial affair, from a legal perspective. 
36 This is elaborated in detail by TURAǦONZODA, 2011: 16–27.
37 The suolu ǧavob and fatovo are cited with the name / alias of the questioner and the date the 
question was submitted. Due to the changes of the website, not all fatovo quoted in this 
paper are still online. Readers interested in the original fatovo may address the cor-
responding author for further details (s. note 1). 
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However, in recent years, registrations of marriages with ZAGS have been de-
clining. In particular, in rural Tajikistan only the religious ceremony is con-
ducted with far reaching consequences for women, since the enforcement of a 
religious marriage contract (in case of divorce or inheritance) cannot be 
submitted to a civil court.38 Additionally, polygyny – often contracted in front of 
a local mullo – has become a wide spread phenomenon in Tajikistan.39 In the 
suolu ǧavob section of <www.turajon.org>, the issue of polygyny is frequently 
addressed by women, thus indicating the importance of the matter.40 Despite the 
official ban on polygyny, the Turaǧon-brothers discuss polygyny as a ‘normal’ 
social practice in a Muslim society, which is only corrupted when ignorant 
ulamo do not apply the Islamic legal provisions correctly. When the polygamous 
nikoh is properly implemented, the woman should be emotionally and materially 
satisfied (rozigī). Hoǧī Akbar explicates (to “Fotima” on 8 February 2011) the 
Islamic provisions regarding nafaqa (support by a husband for his wife), i.e. that 
the husband is responsible for providing all vital necessities: Housing, clothing 
and food. Should he not be able to provide this, a woman can appeal for divorce 
with a mufti. Hoǧī Akbar’s suggestion to appeal to the muftiyot (i.e. the High 
Council of ulamo) should again be understood as a further affront against the 
official institutions since they would de jure reject any judgment on a poly-
gamous marriage and relegate the issue to a civil court (which would likely 
consider the case an offense against Tajikistan’s civil code).  
Nuriddinǧon concedes to a “Muslim woman” (1 December 2012), who had 
confided in him her deep despair about her husband’s intention to marry a 
second wife, that he understands her concerns and agrees that polygyny is 
difficult (dušvor) for a woman to accept. However, he concludes, that every 
woman who endures the jealousy (rašk) in a polygamous marriage will receive a 
martyr’s reward (aǧri šahid) in reference to Surah az-Zumar (39:10). And Mah-
mudǧon, in an answer to “Raxmatulloh” (4 May 2010), states that the “rights of 
men regarding their wives are indeed extensive and that a wife who could not 
satisfy her husband leaves this world with a grave sin (gunohi buzurg)”. Hoǧī 
Akbar, however, considers also the particular rights of women in a polygamous 
marriage. For instance, “Fotima” (8 February 2011) reports that she is the se-
cond wife of her husband and that neither she nor her husband’s first wife had 
38  Cf. ROCHE / HOHMANN, 2011. 
39  There is no reliable data on polygyny in Tajikistan, cf. QODIR, 2011. 
40  In the sample of fatovo from 2009 to 2011, about one third of all questions addressed by 
women to the three brothers were related to the issue of polygyny. 
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conceived a child to date. Hence, her husband announced that he would marry 
another woman in the event she did not get pregnant. Hoǧī Akbar rejects the 
man’s intention and urges “Fotima” to convince her husband to do a medical 
check to determine whether he might be infertile (aqim). Hoǧī Akbar and his 
brothers discuss polygamous marriages as common practice in the Tajik society 
and do not explicitly refer to the judicial implications.41 Instead, they provide 
tangible advice which publicly acknowledges the particular burden on women 
and admonishes men to comply with the liabilities stipulated in the Islamic law. 
Importantly, this discussion takes place within a new public sphere in which 
female Muslims can address anonymously male ulamo in an environment where 
the government is not able to monopolize or manipulate the discussion.42
A likewise contentious issue in contemporary Tajikistan is the hijab. Tajiki-
stan’s government has imposed a dress code in government institutions, includ-
ing hospitals, schools and universities, banning the hijab and suggestive dress. A 
number of the Turaǧon-brothers’ fatovo come in direct contradiction to the state 
legislation since they maintain that women should be wearing hijab under all 
non-mahram conditions (i.e. in presence of males who are not members of the 
family).43
For example, “Sherzod” (5 January 2011) presents the following circum-
stance: his mother is a doctor, his father lost his job and is currently unem-
ployed, and he also has a serious health condition. Sherzod goes on telling that 
his mother performs her prayers (namoz), but her supervisor does not allow her 
to wear her headscarf at work, so he asks for advice on behalf of his mother. In a 
lengthy answer with references to the Koran, Mahmudǧon says that under no cir-
cumstances should this woman take off her headscarf, since it is a religious duty 
(farz), and not wearing it is a great sin (gunohi buzurg). Mahmudǧon, instead, 
suggests looking for a job in another medical facility, which, perhaps, will be 
more lenient toward hijab. In similar advice to “Bibioiša” (7 April 2011), Hoǧī 
Akbar explains that the Islamic šariʿa does not oppose women working, how-
ever the general conditions should allow a woman to wear the hijab and fulfil 
the daily prayers and not be exposed to irreligious deeds. However, Hoǧī Akbar 
concedes that, in particular in the case of single mothers, women cannot simply 
41 According to Article 170 of Tajikistan’s penal code, polygamy is considered to be a criminal 
offense. Tajikistan’s Office of Public Persecution has repeatedly opened investigations 
against oppositional politicians on charges of polygamy, recently in the case of the former 
Ministry of Industry, Zayd Zaidov.
42 Cf. the observations in EICKELMAN / ANDERSON, 2003.
43 SARKOROVA, 2005.
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quit work. In these cases, they should try to wear the hijab (which is forbidden in 
government institutions including universities), avoid being alone with men, and 
preserve the “etiquette and dignity” (odobu viqor) of a Muslim woman”. 
A related question from “Zuhro” (25 September 2010) states that young 
women are not allowed to wear headscarves (satr) in universities and hospitals 
(where she is interning). She tries to cover her hair and neck and asks if she is 
still liable to a sin. In his answer Nuriddinǧon, echoes his younger brother’s ver-
dict stating that hijab is a duty (farz) for all Muslim women and only non-belie-
vers (beimon) can ignore that duty. However, there is an important distinction 
between the two fatovo: While Mahmudǧon suggests change of employment, 
Nuriddinǧon takes a more affirmative position and advises the young woman to 
demand her rights and not to allow her hijab to be taken from her. Nuriddinǧon 
says that no law in Tajikistan stipulates a ban on hijab. On the contrary it is a 
policy of a group of people who do not fear God (xudonotars). 
Nuriddinǧon discusses the hijab issue in a wider context of male / female 
relations as well as alleged mentalities or ‘nature’. On the question posted by 
“Dilovar” (8 May 2011) concerning why women must wear the hijab and not 
men, Nuriddinǧon declares the “women’s body arouses lust (barangezandai šah-
vat)”. God has created the “nature of men (tabiyati mard)” in a way that they 
easily get aroused by female bodies. Women, on the other hand, do not get exci-
ted by uncovered male faces. As in other fatovo, Nuriddinǧon employs reference 
to the Koran, but he also quotes a French newspaper to support his arguments. 
According to Nuriddinǧon, the newspaper reported more than 4.412 sexual 
assaults against women in France for the year 2010. The article also pointed out 
that the actual number is considered to be much higher since most women did 
not report to the police out of shame (šarm). Nuriddinǧon explicates that “all 
these incidents of sexual assaults against the honour (nomus) were committed by 
men (az tarafi mard surat megirad)”. He continues, that US statistics indicate 
that 31% of women in the USA were exposed to sexual assaults (ǧinoyati 
taǧovuz ba nomus), and that an important NGO reported that every two-and-
half-minute a woman becomes a victim of a sexual assault: “This happens in a 
country where the hijab is considered as oppression”. Thus, Nuriddinǧon 
demonstrates with his use of sources and his argumentation, that he belongs to 
the ‘modern (muasir) ulamo’ who consider the various life spheres and who un-
cover the arrogance of ‘Western’ perceptions of Islam. However, he simul-
taneously distracts with this statement from his implicit legitimization of male 
violence against women by referring to the alleged ‘nature’ of men. 
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Interestingly, Hoǧī Akbar in a different question concerning mosque atten-
dance of women (“Iftixor” on 8 February 2011), ridicules the statement of an 
imom-xatib who had defended the ban on women to participate at Friday prayers 
with the argument that women’s “figure (qadu qomat)” detracts the male con-
gregation. Hoǧī Akbar (implicitly contradicting his brother’s statement) rejects 
this idea and concludes that an imom-xatib has to follow the directives of the 
High Council of ulamo even if they are inconsistent with the religious principles. 
Eventually, he gives the discussion a twist by addressing conflicts within the 
religious authorities in Tajikistan and fiercely criticizes the government: 
It is a pity that we Muslims need to follow the imposed concepts of others. The enemies of 
religion know that a woman is a mother, and a mother is the fundamental tutor / instructor of 
the children. If a mother is a believer and god-fearing (xudotars), and if she visits the 
mosque and is informed about the Koran and the Sunna, it is self-evident that she will bring 
up her children in this way. Therefore this plan (naqša) [by the government] is designed to 
distance [women and mothers from religion] in order to keep women away from listening to 
amri maʿruf and the religious foundations. It is their intention that the future generation 
(naslhoi oyanda) does not know about Islam and [grows up] ignorant (ǧohil), and that pure 
Islam is eradicated (Islomi nob) in the society. 
Hoǧī Akbar complains that public space for negotiating Islam for women is re-
stricted, and the ulamo are not even allowed to address this issue on television or 
in the radio. “Then, how should a woman as a member of a Muslim society 
know about the principles of religion?” 
The state’s overreach into the religious field is a central issue in the bro-
thers’ alternative discourse. Hoǧī Akbar adamantly criticized the Tajik President 
Rahmon for signing the law on parental responsibility, which bans youths under 
18 years old from attending Friday prayers in the mosques. In the fatvo section 
of the website, Hoǧī Akbar maintains that it is a Muslim’s duty (farz) to attend 
Friday prayer congregations once he / she reaches the age of puberty (baloġat). 
What is notable, however, is that Turaǧonzoda tries to maintain a fragile balance 
in order not to sound too oppositional. For example, “Khurshedi gharib” ad-
dresses Hoǧī Akbar (16 August 2011): 
[Y]ou are the hero of the Muslim nation, I count on God and then on you, please, do 
something (iloǧe kuned) to change the law [on the parental responsibility] so that it does not 
turn [our] Muslim nation into infidels. 
Hoǧī Akbar responds in the following manner: 
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Muslim brother, adopting or changing of this law is not in our hands, this is a state matter. 
We did the best we could do on our part. We have voiced our criticism of this law via mass 
media. Now all is left to us is to pray so that God grants conscience (insof) to the statesmen, 
so that they withdraw from this anti-God law and make it void.  
On a related matter, “Abubakr” says (23 July 2011) that people in Tajikistan
face challenges from the government in performing their religious duties. He 
says that “we” knowingly remain silent, and asks if God will hold “us” account-
able for it. Also, he asks whether following government-created laws will free 
them of the sin associated with the (state-)required behaviour. Hoǧī Akbar says 
that Muslims should not follow the laws that go against the practice of religion 
(ibodat) and God’s universal laws. He continues by saying that if the law is 
against the requirements of God, Muslims should not abide by them, irrespective 
of whether the law comes from the Shah or the President. Turaǧonzoda main-
tains, 
when a human says not to pray and God demands to pray, we should consider God’s orders 
above all the orders of the beings. The performance of God’s laws depends on dignity / 
honour (nomus) and faith (imondorī) of each individual, however.  
7. Societal and political implications
To counter the prominence of the Turaǧon-brothers, in both physical and virtual 
realms, the Tajik government agencies and officials have adopted a number of 
constraining actions. Nuriddinǧon, for example, has faced pressures from the 
National Security Committee by being subjected to numerous interrogations 
under the charges of undermining the secular state and political order.44 Access 
to the <www.turajon.org> site was blocked repeatedly by the directives coming 
from the State Communications Services. According to Hoǧī Akbar, 2011 was 
the year of the family’s humiliation by the state. He cited the arson at their 
family business facility (the cotton-processing plant Paxta), obstruction of their 
business (farmers not being allowed to deliver raw cotton to Turaǧonzoda’s 
factory), refusal to publish Hoǧī Akbar’s book on the place of women in Islam, 
and, finally, the dramatic dispute with the chairman of High Council of ulamo –
Saidmukarram Abdulqodirov, all being a part of the state’s concerted effort to 
44 MILOD, 2008.
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undermine the family’s influence in Tajik society.45 Persecutions continued in 
2012, as well. Nuriddinǧon was initially forced to step down from imom-xatib
positions in their mosque, and later the mosque was downgraded from being a 
Friday-mosque (licensed to conduct Friday congregational prayers) to only a 
five-times-prayer mosque (masǧidi panǧvaqta), thus depriving the Turaǧon 
family from their Friday xutba pulpit. 
Importantly, it should be noted that the challenges to the Turaǧon-brothers 
emanate not only from the state. Indeed, the very nature of the new public sphere 
is conducive to a greater degree of contestation. A crucial aspect of the new 
public sphere, as seen by Eickelman and Anderson, includes the fact that the 
new technologies significantly change common perception of the public and pri-
vate domains, often blurring the boundaries between the two.46 As a conse-
quence, the new communication technologies also have transformational 
potential in that they can change public discourse and narratives. The recent 
publication on Sufi brotherhoods and practices in Tajikistan, followed by 
another article presenting the video of a Qaderiyya zikr (remembrance of God) 
produced a very heated debate in the cyber community over the compatibility of 
such practices and experiences within the framework of a normative Hanafi 
Sunni Islam. Hoǧī Akbar Turaǧonzoda vociferously defended ešoni Xalilǧon 
(the Qaderiyya sheikh whose zikr circle was recorded) and argued that such 
practice “bears no contradiction to Islam or Islamic fiqh”. Moreover, he went on 
to call those who did raise question on the normativity of Sufi practices in 
Tajikistan adherents of atheism and Salafism.47 This incident vividly illuminates 
that when experiences that were meant to be exclusive and private (such as a zikr 
with a particular sheikh) become public via the new forms of broadcast, they 
produce new avenues in the existing discourse, especially with regards to the 
role of religion and religious leaders in society. 48 The incident also vividly 
demonstrates that this newly emerging public sphere is in fact a highly contested 
one. Turaǧonzoda’s presentation of his opponents as atheists and Salafis, both of 
which he views as alien and illegitimate, is telling of the degree of the contention 
that takes place. Such vibrancy is to be expected, however, as Peter Mandaville 
45 TURSUNZODA, 2012.
46 EICKELMAN / ANDERSON, 2003: 14–15.
47 RADIO OZODĪ, 2013a.
48 See the recent scandal about an alleged private sex video of a Tajik imom-xatib (RADIO 
OZODĪ, 2013b).
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notes, new technologies “allow greater numbers of people to take Islam into 
their own hands, opening new spaces for debate and critical dialogue”.49 
The analysis of the Turaǧon-brothers and the virtual public sphere they 
actively aspire to establish can be greatly aided by the insights offered in Manuel 
Castells model of power and counterpower. In this framework, the means of 
coercion and / or construction of meaning form the underlying dynamics that 
produce disciplinary discourses within a society. Castells posits that challenging 
status quo power relationships involves (re)production of alternative discourses 
“that have the potential to overwhelm the disciplinary discursive capacity of the 
state”50 – a necessary condition to neutralize its coercive capacity. Thus, Cas-
tells’ model would suggest that the alternative normative discourse (re)con-
structed by the brothers stands as a challenge and attempt to take over the 
official disciplinary discourse.  
In the case of the Turaǧon-brothers, we can contend that they are (re)pro-
ducing this alternative disciplinary discourse, introducing new normative codes, 
and therefore challenging the legal institutions of the state by calling to follow 
the šarīʿa. In particular, their advice on the role of women in a Muslim society 
frequently contradicts Tajikistan’s secular law and government’s imagination. 
Indeed, control over the female body has preoccupied center stage in both domi-
nant official and challenging religious discourse, perhaps in a mutual (but un-
expressed) understanding, that whoever controls the women’s body (sexuality, 
dress code, female public sphere) has an edge in the discursive contestation 
taking place in the post-Soviet and (perhaps in the meantime more importantly) 
post-Civil War Tajik society. 
8. Concluding remarks 
It is our contention that the Turaǧon-brothers create alternative disciplinary dis-
course to counter state’s power discourse by introducing new codes of religious 
normativity, in particular regarding the role of women in society. Furthermore, 
by challenging the official power discourse, the brothers are attempting to intro-
duce a new hegemony of knowledge where their interpretation of social and 
Islamic normativity precedes (in importance) the disciplinary discourse (re)pro-
49  MANDAVILLE, 2002: 88.  
50  CASTELLS, 2009: 16. 
NEGOTIATING ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY TAJIKISTAN 985 
AS/EA LXVII•3•2013, S. 965–990
duced by the state, as well as, contesting normative discourses originating from 
competing religious and non-religious authorities.  
These contestations and negotiations over the social and, more importantly, 
Islamic normativity are taking place in a new public sphere. Since technological 
advancements engender this new public sphere, the figures capable of intro-
ducing their form of knowledge and ‘normativity’ using the new means of 
communications can significantly transform the discursive space. This paper 
indicates that the case of the Turaǧon-brothers is illustrative of such develop-
ments. Indeed, it was demonstrated that the Turaǧon family successfully em-
ploys the new platform to engage in the topics of ‘normativity’ and hegemony of 
knowledge, relevant not only to an individual’s personal Islamic experience and 
practice but also to his / her stance as a member of society and a citizen.  
Current social and political commentary on Tajikistan, one way or the 
other, touches upon the issue of migration. Indeed, with a significant number of 
the population working abroad and sending remittances home that maintain the 
country’s relative economic stability, ignoring this factor would produce a de-
ficient analysis. We posit that the diaspora of labour migrants scattered (all over 
the world but predominantly) across Russia is one of the most important aspects 
of the newly emerging public sphere. And although the term of diaspora in a po-
litical sense might not be very relevant to this segment of the population as they 
have not yet taken conscious steps to influence the political developments back 
home, the new public sphere and the usage of new communication technologies 
has created meaningful acts that foster a sense of imagined solidarities tran-
scending the national boundaries of Tajikistan.  
The observations made in this paper present sufficient grounds to argue that 
future contestations over the normativity, Islamic and otherwise, are most likely 
to take place in the discursive realm of the new public sphere. Moreover, the 
new public sphere, by blurring the lines between the private and the public, 
makes such challenges not only possible but also visible. Regardless of who will 
have more prominence and authority in the new public sphere, one thing is for 
certain – the state will have less and less success in curbing the religious spe-
cialists and their alternative discourse, ultimately leading to major reconfigu-
ration and rethinking of the role and importance of Islam not only in private but 
also in public / social realms. 
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